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Judicial recourse to constitutional law sources
from abroad has been likened to the process of
bricolage--coined by anthropologist Claude Lvi-
Strauss, this refers to the "borrowing from materials
readily at hand." Building on the idea of constitutional
borrowing, this paper aims to take account of the role
dominant political culture plays in constitutional
interpretation, in particular, the values associated with
economic globalization. If resort to comparative
constitutional sources is on the rise, dominant political
culture will likely have the effect of limiting the stock of
tools available to judges. The author argues that, in an
age of economic globalization, the "buyer-seller" model
of constitutional interpretation will be one of the
principal interpretive sources readily at hand. This is a
model which valorizes market relations of free and
mutual exchange, ideas familiar to U.S. constitutional
law particularly in the Lochner era. It is argued that this
market model has emerged as an important mode of
interpretation in Canadian constitutional lawsince 1982.
This is suggested by an examination of recent decisions
in the realms of federalism, Charter rights, and
Aboriginal rights, though not all cases can be explained
in this way. Nor is this a phenomenon isolated to
Canada; rather, it is to be expected that the buyer-seller
model will have universal appeal, for it appears to be the
best available method of securing economic success in
an era of intense competition between national states
for foreign capital.
Tel que d6crit par 'anthropologue Claude Levi-
Strauss, le recours aux sources constitutionnelles de
I'ext6rieur du pays ressemble un processus de
bricolage et 6quivaut fs un emprunt de mat6riaux
facilement disponibles. Par l'entremise d'une discussion
des emprunts constitutionnels, cet article a pour but
I'examen du r6le dont se dote la culture politique dans
l'interpr6tation constitutionnelle et, plus
particuli rement, les valeurs associ6es la globalisation
6conomique. Si Ion peut remarquer une hausse dans le
recours aux sources constitutionnelles comparatives, Ia
culture politique dominante pourrait limiter la gamme
d'outils disponibles aux juges. L'auteur maintient que
dans une 6poque de globalisation 6conomique, le
module vendeur-client de l'interprdtation
constitutionnelle deviendra I'un des outils
d'interpr~tation facilement disponibles. II s'agit d'un
module qui valorise les 6changes libres et mutuels au
sein des relations 6conomiques, familier au droit
constitutionnel amdricain de 1'6poque de Lochner. En
examinant des d6cisions en matihre du f~d6ralisme, des
droits fondamentaux offerts par Ia Charte et des droits
aborigines, I'auteur maintient que cc mod6le 5 la base
du march6 est devenu un mode important
d'interpr~tation dans le droit constitutionnel canadien
depuis 1982, malgr6 les exceptions cette r gle. Ce
ph6nomne nest pas uniquement canadien,.mais le
modele vendeur-client aurait suppos6ment un attrait
universel puisqu'il semble &tre la meilleure faqon de
garantir le succs 6conomique clans une re de
comp6tition intense entre les nations pour les capitaux
6trangers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Some time ago, Montesquieu argued that the laws of each nation
are those best suited to a number of variables which, when taken together,
comprise the essence of a people. Factors such as geography, religion,
history, and form of government were determinative of this essence.
Montesquieu declared that the best constitution "is one whose particular
arrangement best relates to the disposition of the people for whom it is
established."' Particularity now has given way to universality. In the
contemporary world, there is talk of the rise of "world constitutionalism"2
and "a world-wide legal culture."3 Due to the proliferation of constitutional
borrowing in the formation, drafting, and interpretation of constitutional
text, the outlines of a global cluster of constitutional principles, it is
claimed, have come into view.4
For Mark Tushnet, the idea of "constitutional bricolage" best
reflects the tendency to constitutional borrowing in the modern age.5
Bricolage-coined by anthropologist Claude L6vi-Strauss, meaning
borrowing from what is readily at hand 6-displaces emphasis on
constitutional unity in favour of constitutional compromise and
contingency. According to this account, framers and interpreters seek
immediate solutions to constitutional problems and so they will look to the
surfeit of materials at hand, including other constitutional regimes. Yet,
constitutional borrowing has not proliferated to every corner of the globe.
One of the world's oldest constitutional democracies, the United States,
continues to resist this trend.' Borrowing of this sort, moreover, is not
strictly a contemporary phenomenon. Consider, for example, the lively
ICharles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, ed. and trans. by Anne M.
Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller & Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)
at 8.
2 Bruce Ackerman, "The Rise of World Constitutionalism" (1997) 83 Va. L. Rev. 771.
3 Mark Tushnet, "The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law" (1999) 108 Yale L.J. 1225
at 1286 [Tushnet, "Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law"]. For an earlier invocation of the
bricoleur, see Mark Tushnet, "The Bricoleur at the Center," Book Review of The Partial Constitution
by Cass R. Sunstein (1993) 60 U. Chicago L. Rev. 1071.
4 David Beatty, Constitutional Law in Theoy and Practice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1995) at 10, 142.
5 See Tushnet, "Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law,"supra note 3. See also Annelise
Riles, "Wigmore's Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information" (1999) 40 Harv. Int'l
L.J. 221 at 279, n. 205.
6 Claude L~vi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966) at 17-36.
Sujit Choudhry, "Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative
Constitutional Interpretation" (1999) 74 Ind. L.J. 819 at 830-32.
Constitutional Bricolage in Canada
Anglo-American constitutional conversation giving rise to "classical legal
thought" of the late nineteenth century.8  Talk about global
constitutionalism and bricolage deserves our attention, however, if only
because it helps to explain a number of developments within Canadian
constitutional law and elsewhere over the past twenty years.
In an age of economic globalization, states increasingly are under
pressure to adopt legal regimes that emulate economic success experienced
elsewhere. Growing membership in the European Union, the rise of
regional trading blocs, the global expanse of bilateral investment treaties,
and the emergence of the World Trade Organization as a global force are
manifestations of this increasing pressure on states to adopt legal forms
that stimulate trade and investment. This pressure also is being felt in the
realm of constitutional law. Constitutionalism, after all, is a convenient
device for limiting, or at least slowing down, state capacity to intervene in
markets. States, therefore, are asked to embrace a variety of pre-
commitment strategies that constrain their capacity to regulate markets.
For instance, in Latin America, constitutional obligations to protect the
national patrimony are giving way to privatization schemes and other
''governance" strategies that are more amenable to strategies for economic
growth championed by international lending institutions.9 Judicial actors
also have a role to play in these developments: the judiciary can either be
conscripted by or resist these tendencies.1" In these cases, framers and
interpreters are under pressure to adopt dominant values. and
strategies-constitutional difference, after all, does not "add value" in an
age of economic globalization.
The phenomenon described here has its Canadian analogue.
Among the notable developments in Canadian constitutional law is the role
that the market-premised on the free and mutual exchange of value
between buyers and sellers-increasingly plays in constitutional
interpretation. In this article, I argue that Canadian courts are embracing
the "buyer-seller" model of constitutional interpretation. This model places
8 See Hugh Tulloch, James Btyce's American Commonwealth: The Anglo-American Background
(Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1988); David Schneiderman, "Constitutionalism in an Age of Anxiety: A
Reconsideration of the Local Prohibition Case" (1996) 41 McGill L.J. 411 [Schneiderman,
"Constitutionalism in an Age of Anxiety"]. On classical legal thought, see Duncan Kennedy, "Towards
a Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America,
1850-1940" (1980) 3 Res. L. & Soc. 3.
9 See David Schneiderman, "Constitutional Approaches to Privatization: An Inquiry Into the
Magnitude of Neo-Liberal Constitutionalism" (2000) 63 Law and Contemp. Probs. 83.
10 See e.g. my discussion of Israeli and Colombian high courts in David Schneiderman,
"Comparative Constitutional Law in an Age of Economic Globalization" in Vicki C. Jackson & Mark
Tushnet, eds., Defining the Field of Comparative Constitutional Law (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002)
237 [Schneiderman, "Age of Economic Globalization"].
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emphasis on market relations and conscripts constitutional interpretation
as a promotional vehicle for market values. It is a model conducive to the
market exchange that was a dominant mode of constitutional interpretation
in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries."
Associated with the period known as the "Lochner era," this
interpretative trope licensed the judiciary to shackle legislative power in
order to advance business interests. 2 Dominant in this period was a style
of constitutional thought concerned not only with the rationality of
legislative power-the typical "means-ends" inquiry-but also with
prevailing societal norms.' 3 In other words, judicial review provided an
entry point for culture. 4 Gerald Garvey invoices the trope "constitutional
bricolage" to describe this judicial reliance on received values and ruling
principles. 5
In Part II, I inquire into the idea of constitutional borrowing or
bricolage. In order to make the model more robust, I maintain that we
should account for the role culture plays in moulding interpretive strategies
in constitutional law. In Part III, following Garvey, I argue that interpretive
tools are at hand for reasons having to do with dominant societal norms
and values, particularly those that have infiltrated Canadian legal and
political culture by reason of Canada's geopolitical proximity to the
hegemon of the contemporary world. 6
In Part IV, I examine the incorporation of the model of market
relations into Canadian constitutional law. While Canada is not
experiencing, nor has it experienced, a type of Lochnerian episode,
constitutional interpretation currently is shifting conspicuously in the
direction of the market model. This shift comports well with the buyer-
seller model identifiable in the Lochner era. I argue that this shift is
discernible in some instances of Supreme Court interpretation, not only of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms but also of Canadian
federalism and Aboriginal rights.
IIGerald Garvey, Constitutional Bficolage (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).
12 It also enabled legislative authority to remove obstacles to market exchange. See ibid. at 102.
3
Ibid. at 113.
14 Law was "brought into harmony with the broader culture." See ibid. at 3.
15 Ibid. at 14-15.
16 On this, see Stephen Clarkson, Uncle Sam and US: Globalization, Neoconservatism, and the
Canadian State (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002).
17 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [Charter].
Constitutional Bricolage in Canada
Not all constitutional interpretation under the Charter over the last
twenty years can be explained in this way. If we think of judicial review as
an entry point for dominant political culture, however, that elements of
Canadian constitutional law are moving in this direction should come as no
surprise. After all, economic rationality played a role, though often
obscured, in the interpretation of the Canadian division of legislative
powers.'8 The proclamation of the Constitution Act, 1982t9 significantly
enlarged the range of judicial inquiry into legislative enactment from that
which occurred previously. Courts remain constrained in significant ways,
as they have in the past, by text, legal argumentation, and precedent. 20 This
shift, however, reflects the influence of larger patterns of socio-economic
and political behavior-what Harry Arthurs calls the "globalization of the
mind. '' 21 If judicial interpretation leads us to the "grand entrance hall, 22 of
values associated with dominant political culture, then we should find traces
of the values we associate with economic globalization and its political
handmaiden, neo-liberalism.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL BRICOLAGE
Adopting Lvi-Strauss' terminology,23 constitutional bricolage refers
to the activity whereby constitution makers and interpreters look to the
constitutional tools "at hand"-tools which may originate from
constitutional regimes elsewhere-to solve constitutional problems. For
Tushnet, constitutional bricolage represents a method of comparative
constitutional analysis that helps to explain contemporary constitutional
borrowing. 24 Bricolage also may be the method best suited for the "cautious
and careful" incorporation of constitutional experiences elsewhere into
U.S. constitutional law. An exemplar of bricolage in the contemporary
world may be the new South African constitutional regime. Breaking from
18
See Schneiderman, "Constitutionalism in an Age of Anxiety," supra note 8. See also J.R.
Mallory, "The Courts and the Sovereignty of Canadian Parliament" (1944) 10 Can. J. Ec. Pol. Sc. 167.
19 Being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
20 See the classic statement in Max Lerner, "The Supreme Court and American Capitalism"
(1933) 42 Yale L.J. 668 and the fuller account in Pierre Bourdieu, "The Force of Law: Toward a
Sociology of the Juridical Field" (1987) 38 Hastings L.J. 805.
21 H.W. Arthurs, "Globalization of the Mind: Canadian Elites and the Restructuring of Legal
Fields" (1997) 12 C.J.L.S. 219.
22 Manitoba Provincial Judges Association v. Manitoba (Minister of Justice), [19971 3 S.C.R. 3 at
78.
23 Supra note 6 at 17-36.
24 See Tushnet, "Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law," supra note 3.
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a racist constitutional past, the South African constitutional text mandates
that judges have recourse to international law and other constitutional
regimes in the course of judicial interpretation of the Bill of Rights."
Tushnet contrasts this notion of constitutional bricolage with
functionalism-where constitutional text serves certain predictable
functions, like economic development--and expressivism-where
constitutionalism is viewed as the outgrowth of distinctive political
communities, resembling Montesquieu's account. The idea of bricolage
destabilizes the presumed rationality inherent in functionalism and the
essentialism suggested by expressivism.26 Keeping open the possibility of
critique, the bricoleur views constitutional regimes as the product of
indeterminate outcomes and so "existing legal materials [will be] coopted
and transformed to address the problem at hand."2 7
If Tushnet thereby emphasizes the agency of judicial interpreters,
he elides the structural constraints that help to determine the materials
interpreters will have "at hand." The element of constraint, in other words,
is obscured in this account. A similar blurring occurs in much work in
cultural studies. Dick Hebdige, for instance, invokes bricolage to describe
the appropriation of the signs and symbols of dominant culture by English
skinheads and punks.28 School uniforms, rain coats, safety pins, and lavatory
chains were "symbolically defiled ... and juxtaposed" by new subcultures.
These improvised combinations generated new meanings upsetting "every
relevant discourse."2 9 For Hebdige, dominant meanings are not fixed or
guaranteed but are capable of fracture, resistance, and transformation.3 °
The appropriation of the signs and symbols as means of resistance may
constitute, as Ranajit Guha writes, "a project predicated on power.','" But
this belies the capacity of signs, taken alone, to upset relations of power.
25 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, No. 108 of 1996, s. 39(1). See discussion
in Choudhry, supra note 7 at 841 ff.
26 See Tushnet, "Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law," supra note 3 at 1286.
2 7 Ibid. at 1301.
28 Dick Hebdige, Subculture: The Meaning of Style (London: Methuen, 1979) at 102-06.
29 Ibid. at 107-08.
3 0 Ibid. at 103, 116.
31 Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1983) at 75. Guha writes about the appropriation of symbols in Indian peasant
insurgencies-as in forms of dress or an upturned moustache-as only "the very beginning" of class
consciousness and self-awareness. These forms of rebel discourse were in the "borrowed language"
of the enemy. See ibid. at 19ff, 75.
Constitutional Bricolage in Canada
Rather, consumer-led accounts tend to exaggerate the scope of freedom
available and resulting shifts in dominant understandings.32
We might bring in the element of structural constraint by returning
to L6vi-Strauss' account. L6vi-Strauss contrasts the worlds of the engineer
with those of the bricoleur. The engineer uses the stock of available tools
for definite and determinate uses.33 The bricoleur, by contrast, can imagine
using a set of tools and materials-his "treasury" 34-in different and
heterogenous ways; he will make do with "whatever is at hand." But, L6vi-
Strauss maintains, the "universe of instruments available" to the bricoleur
is "closed" and their possibility of use always remains "limited by the
particular history of each piece." In other words, there are limits to the
bricoleur's "freedom of manouevre."35 If the engineer is "trying to make his
way out of and go beyond the constraints imposed by a particular state of
civilization," the bricoleur "by inclination or necessity always remains within
,them."
36
Diagnoses of contemporary constitutional borrowing also must
admit that only a closed set of tools, with particular histories, are available
at hand. Tushnet elsewhere emphasizes that judicial choice is constrained
by a "highly developed" and "deeply entrenched" system that structures
interpretation in ways compatible with the values of liberal capitalism. 37 In
an age of economic globalization, we might want also to admit that judicial
borrowing similarly is limited to a small range of acceptable outcomes. The
range will be consonant with a historically contingent but dominant view of
constitutionalism with pretensions to universality, yet reflective only of a
particular version of U.S. constitutional law.38
32 See Nicholas Garnham, "Political Economy and Cultural Studies: Reconciliation or Divorce?"
(1995) 12 Critical Studies in Mass Communication 62.
33 Supra note 6 at 18.
34 Ibid. at 18.
35 Ibid. at 19.
36 Ibid.
37 Mark V. Tushnet, "Following the Rules Laid Down: Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral
Principles" (1983) 96 Harv. L. Rev. 781 at 824.
38 On the claim to universality in law, see Bourdieu, supra note 20 at 844. For the argument that
this "master narrative" of U.S. constitutional law does not represent U.S. constitutional history, see
William J. Novak, The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).
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III. THE BUYER-SELLER MODEL
One reason for the success of the U.S. model of rights abroad in the
last half century, it has been said, is the increasing acceleration of social and
economic relations-the oft-cited "compression of time and space."
Judicial review under a bill of rights provides opportunities for flexible and
adaptive interpretation. William Scheuerman suggests that this flexibility
offers a legal recipe for societies experiencing difficulty responding to the
challenges of economic globalization. 39 To be sure, as Morton Horwitz and
Bernard Hibbitts have shown, judges have in the past manipulated legal
doctrine so as to facilitate the improvement of market mechanisms.40 In an
era of constitutional convergence, however, constitutionalism also
facilitates the spread of market values by locking in gains made by
transnational capital in the post-1989 international economic
environment.4 Rather than making legal regimes more fluid and flexible,
as Scheuerman argues, constitutional law in the age of economic
globalization plays a significant role-as it often has in the pasta2-in
preserving and enhancing the position of economically powerful interests
by constraining state capacity in regard to the market.43
Constitutionalism long has been associated with market values.
James Madison famously admitted that U.S. constitutional design was
intended to safeguard the interests of the propertied from dispossessed
factions.44 Constitutionalism in the United Kingdom has been portrayed as
a vehicle for preserving vested interests or as a prophylactic to class rule.45
Karl Polanyi characterized U.S. constitutionalism as having as its objective
William E. Scheuerman, "Constitutionalism in an Age of Speed" Const. Commentary
[forthcoming in 2002]. Canadian constitutional courts, it might be said, have eagerly embraced the
capacity for judicial innovation in constitutional interpretation. Cases like the Quebec Secession
Reference suggest that the Supreme Court has great confidence in its ability to adapt constitutional law
to the demands of socio-political realpolitik. See Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [199812 S.C.R. 217.
40 Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1977); Bernard J. Hibbitts, "Progress and Principle: The Legal Thought of Sir John
Beverley Robinson" (1989) 34 McGill L.J. 454.
41 Schneiderman, "Age of Economic Globalization," supra note 10.
42 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957).
As Wolin reminds us, political economy "reveals a depoliticized state rather than the
depoliticized economy emphasized by the economists." See Sheldon S. Wolin, Tocqueville Between Two
Worlds: The Making ofa Political and TheoreticalLife (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001) at
349.
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. by Clinton
Rossiter (New York: Mentor Books, 1961) at 78-79.
45 See discussion in Schnciderman, "Constitutionalism in an Age of Anxiety," supra note 8.
Constitutional Bricolage in Canada
the isolation of economic power from the political sphere;46 Zygmunt
Bauman similarly describes the current push toward globalization as
meaning, among other things, "the progressive separation of power from
politics.
4 7
If bricolage-resort to the stock of tools at hand-helps to describe
processes of judicial interpretation in an era of globalization, how might we
identify the inventory to which judges will have resort? Are all
constitutional experiences elsewhere included within the judicial tool kit?
Garvey suggests that the judicial bricoleur's tools will be derived from
society's "political culture." Courts operate within a "received budget of
legal and social concepts" and so will seek to solve legal problems from this
"limited cultural reserve."48 This is not to say, Garvey insists, that judges are
merely cultural dupes, but rather that judges are limited in their ability to
respond to change and so are constrained by the stock of culturally
accepted solutions to legal problems. Processes of globalization-for
instance, transnational judicial conversations between national high
courts49-will presumably widen the inventory of constitutional resources
available to the constitutional bricoleur. But not all constitutional traditions
will be treated equally.
The pressures of economic globalization are being felt at every level
of state institution, though responses by state actors to these pressures may
be different, even contradictory." Even if outcomes are not entirely
predictable, dominant political culture associated with economic
globalization will have the effect of constraining the stock of options
available to decision makers. In the field of constitutional interpretation,
there will be a range of acceptable results, many of which will be expected
to facilitate economic growth and productivity. If there is a worldwide legal
culture, then we will expect its constituent elements to promote economic
liberty and protect private property, the supposed recipes for economic
success in an era of intense competition between national states for foreign
capital. Limiting state capacity to intervene in the market-shrinking the
range for political action in the economic sphere-is the regrettable
consequence. It is not to say that judicial capacity to deflect these cultural
pressures is entirely non-existent. As mentioned, there are a range of
46 Supra note 42 at 225.
47 Zygmunt Bauman, In Search of Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999) at 120.
48 Supra note 11 at 5.
49 See Kirk Makin, "Canadian Legal Wisdom a Hot Commodity Abroad" The Globe and Mail
(28 August 2000) Al.
50 Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, trans. by Patrick Camiller (London: Verso Books,
1980) at 135.
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outcomes that may be acceptable, and these may even contradict the values
associated with the dominant political culture. As William Sewell reminds
us, the reproduction of powerful structures is never automatic: "Structures
are at risk, at least to some extent, in all of the social encounters they
shape."'', But the range of autonomy is also confined, in which case we
might not anticipate that the judiciary, even if inclined to do so, will easily
break free from these constraints.
The rise of the buyer-seller model represents the spread of market
power under constitutionalism, where public power is rendered subordinate
to the economic rationality of private market transactions. The model is
predicated upon a mutuality of interest between willing sellers and buyers
mediated through the exchange of value. 2 For Garvey, the promise of
exchange permits the application of the buyer-seller model to a wide variety
of transactions beyond the traditionally economic. 53 The buyer-seller model
anticipates the payment of compensation-there will be payers and payees
in the market model (this is in contrast to the "donor-donee" model or
"gift" model of distribution). There are close affinities here to another of
Garvey's models, what he calls the "ruler-subject" model. According to this
model, social relations are predicated upon relations of domination and
subordination rather than relations of equal economic opportunity. It is
important to note the close connection between these two models which,
Garvey claims, have been of paramount importance in U.S. constitutional
interpretation.
In the late nineteenth century, U.S. courts were able to screen,
under the guise of the buyer-seller model, "the development of an
essentially exploitative economy in which power, not contract, actually
dominated employer-employee relationships. 5 4 These were relations more
in the nature of those between ruler and subject. It was precisely the failure
of courts in the Lochner era to admit this close connection-that labour
power, made material through individual contracts of employment, was not
equivalent to the power of capital.55 The observation can be generalized,
51 William H. Sewell, Jr., "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation" (1992)
98 Am. Jour. Soc. I at 19.
52 The typical economic explanation, as Marx describes it, is that "in exchange, production and
consumption are mediated through the contingent specificity of individuals." See T. Carver, ed., Karl
Marx: Later Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 134.
53 For instance, the model is generalizable to other spheres, like the sexual division of labour. See
Garvey, supra note 11 at 29.
5 4 Ibid at 31.
55 A realization the U.S. Supreme Court came to only in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937).
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though Garvey does not go so far: relations of domination and
subordination are ubiquitous in market relations.
The vitality of the buyer-seller model in the modern age is
represented well by the centrality of consumerism in market societies.
Consumerism offers a semblance of freedom for many who experience
constraints, if not oppression, in other areas of their lives.56 As exemplified
by Hebdige, work in cultural studies suggests that the agency offered by
consumerism enables the formation of new identities and the pursuit of
independent, even alternative, life strategies." Consumerism provides a
medium for belonging, a surrogate for citizenship at a time when people
are estranged from traditional political processes. Citizenship, according to
this model, is equated with economic membership through purchasing
power. But this is an impoverished version of citizenship; it represents a
class of "imperfect" citizens. 8 Real citizenship rights in the global
economic order are accorded to those with capital, such as foreign investors
and global traders-those whom Leslie Sklair designates the "transnational
capitalist class" 59-in contrast to the aggregate of wage earners or
consumers.
The current citizenship regime might better be described as one
made up of nineteenth-century citizens and twentieth-century consumers.
60
According to David Harvey, the globalization of capital has not resulted in
any momentous change in modes of production and associated social
relations. If there has been any qualitative change, "it is towards the
reassertion of early nineteenth-century capitalist values coupled with a
twenty-first century penchant for pulling everyone (and everything that can
be exchanged) into the orbit of capital., 61 We should not be surprised to
find that Canadian constitutional law also will have been lured toward this
56 See Zygmunt Bauman, Freedom (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988) at 61.
Supra note 28. For a critique, see Garnham, supra note 32. For a defence, see Lawrence
Grossberg, "Cultural Studies vs. Political Economy: Is Anybody Bored With This Debate?" (1995) 12
Critical Studies in Mass Communication 72.
58 1 draw here on Aristotle's formulation. See Politics, Books III and IV, trans. by Richard
Robinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) at 1275'5, 1277"39. This also is suggested in
Zygmunt Bauman, Work, Consumerism and the New Poor (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998)
at 38.
59 Leslie Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class (Oxford: Blackwells, 2001).
60 1 borrow this phrase from Nistor Garcfa Canclini, Consumers and Citizens: Globalization and
Multicultural Conflicts, trans. by George Y6dice (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001).
61 Harvey's quote continues "... while rendering large segments of the world's population
permanently redundant in relation to the basic dynamics of capital accumulation." See David Harvey,
Spaces of Hope (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000) at 68.
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constellation of values. It is to a discussion of this particular constitutional
regime that we now turn.
IV. MARKET CULTURE IN CANADIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Federalism
The central issue for Canadian constitutional law prior to 1982 was
the division of legislative authority between the federal and provincial
governments. According to William Lederman, the classification of laws
between levels of government was at the heart and soul of constitutional
adjudication, not questions about state capacity in relation to individual
rights.62 Even in the performance of this classification function, Canadian
constitutional law did not escape entirely from anxieties raised by
unconstrained legislative authority. There is evidence that judicial review
under the Constitution Act, 186763 was faithful to classical legal thinking by
shielding private property from legislative intrusion and promoting
economic liberty.64 The Charter enhanced, and rendered more transparent,
this objective of promoting market relations. As business interests have
made gains under the Charter, we may lose sight of the role of the law of
Canadian federalism in promoting the buyer-seller model.65
The market model visibly entered into the Canadian law of
federalism in the Supreme Court of Canada decision of Hunt v. T&Nplc. 66
The case concerned a Quebec "blocking statute"-a statute prohibiting the
removal of documents from within the province that may be required for
legal proceedings taking place outside of the province. These statutes
originated as a means of preventing the extraterritorial reach of U.S.
antitrust legislation, but extended to interprovincial requests for the
62 W.R. Lederman, "Classification of Laws Under the British North America Act" in W.R.
Lederman, ed., The Cotrs and the Canadian Constitution (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964)
at 177.
63 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. 11, No. 5.
64 1 have argued that elite anxiety with "class rule"-an anxiety common to legal elites in the
United States and the United Kingdom-entered in Canadian constitutional adjudication in the late-
nineteenth century. See David Schneiderman, "A.V. Dicey, Lord Watson, and the Law of the
Canadian Constitution in the Late Nineteenth Century" (1998) 16 L.H.R. 495.
6S One could begin this discussion by citing the non-binding Agreement on Internal Trade
designed to remove non-tariff restrictions on the movement of goods, services, and persons across
provincial boundaries.
66 [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289 [Hunt]. Here I draw on an arguments made earlier in Joel Bakan et al.,
"Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1993-94 Term" (1995) 6 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. (2d) 67 at 119-25.
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production of documents.67 According to Justice La Forest, writing for the
majority of the Court, rules respecting diversity of jurisdiction were now
anachronistic:68
[l]n our era where numerous transactions and interactions spill over the borders defining
legal communities in our decentralized world legal order, there must ... be a workable
method of coordinating this diversity. Otherwise, the anarchic system's worst attributes
emerge, and individual litigants will pay the inevitable price.
Drawing on structural themes reflected in the 1867 and 1982
constitution acts-common citizenship, mobility rights, the economic
union, and unitary court structure-the Supreme Court found the Quebec
law beyond the provincial legislature's constitutional capacity. Justice La
Forest thereby read into the constitution, without textual foundation, the
"full faith and credit" clause found in the U.S. Constitution.69 Otherwise,
the blocking statute would discourage "international commerce" and the
"efficient allocation and conduct of litigation. ' ° The resulting "higher
transactional costs for interprovincial transactions [would] constitute an
infringement on the unity and efficiency of the Canadian marketplace, as
well as unfairness to the citizen. 71
Justice La Forest drew here on his earlier ruling in Morguard,72
where he invoked the same neo-liberal themes. He declared that "[m]odern
states ... cannot live in splendid isolation., 73 Rather, the modern rules of
comity are "grounded in the need in modern times to facilitate the flow of
wealth, skills and people across state lines in a fair and orderly manner."
Justice La Forest maintained that "[a]ccommodating the flow of wealth,
skills and people across state lines has now become imperative. 74 In Hunt,
these compulsions rise to the level of constitutional obligation.
According to this account, constitutional law must be reconfigured
to facilitate market transactions between buyers and sellers. However
67 Hunt, ibid. at 304.
68 Ibid. at 295.
69 Art. IV, § I states: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records
and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the
manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof."
70 Hunt, supra note 66 at 327.
71 Ibid. at 330.
72 Morguard Investments Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077 at 1098 [Morguard. See also
Justice La Forest's related judgment in Black v. Law Society of Alberta (1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th) 317
(S.C.C.).
73 Morguard, ibid. at 1095.
74 Ibid. at 1096, 1098.
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desirable it may be to remove these kinds of impediments to civil
proceedings (in Hunt, the circumstances were compelling), it is startling
how far the Court is willing to bend Canadian constitutional law in order
to satisfy these economic imperatives. 5 This conclusion is underscored by
the fact that, among the factums filed in the Supreme Court of Canada, no
litigant invoked these neo-liberal rationales. Pierre Bourdieu has written
that legal judgment is the "product of a symbolic struggle between
professionals possessing unequal technical skills and social influence."76
Using its superior position as author of the content of constitutional law,
the Court invokes dominant cultural values-cloaked in a discourse of
inevitability-to steer Canadian constitutional law in the direction of the
market model.77
B. Charter Rights
The market model perhaps is better represented in the
jurisprudence under the Charter. This is not a claim that only economic
interests have been well served by the Charter, for there are varying results
and other discursive threads found in the jurisprudence. For instance, the
idea that some vulnerable groups have benefitted from Charter decision
making-though these victories may be "partial, fragile and
75
There are notable exceptions. See e.g. Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. Richardson (1999),
166 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) [Richardson]. The allocation of egg quotas under Canada's national
marketing scheme for the production and distribution of eggs was challenged under the mobility rights
section of the Charter (section 6). Though egg producers in the Northwest Terrorities were barred
permanently from participating in the interprovincial marketing scheme, the Court ruled that the
scheme was prompted not by discriminatory purposes but by historical patterns of egg production. As
the quota system did not discriminate "primarily" on the basis of residence, it did not offend section
6 rights. Justice McLachlin, dissenting, found that mobility rights were infringed as equality of
opportunity was denied and the scheme did not advance any pressing and substantial objective. Both
the majority and minority in Richardson agreed, however, that barriers to the mobility of capital, goods,
and services that unreasonably discriminate primarily along provincial lines are constitutionally
prohibited under section 6. Yet this is not expressly part of the Charter's mobility rights provisions-in
fact, reform of section 121 of the* Constitution Act, 1867 along just these lines was rejected in the 1980s
and 1990s. So even in Richardson, where a majority of the Court appeared to rebuff the market model,
its influence can be observed.
76 Bourdieu, supra note 20 at 827.
77 Following Stuart Hall, we might call this typically ideological: "representing the order of things
... with that natural or divine inevitability which makes them appear universal, natural and coterminous
with 'reality' itself." See Stuart Hall, "The Rediscovery of Ideology: Return of the Repressed in Media
Studies" in Michael Gurevitch et al., eds., Culture, Society and the Media (London: Methuen, 1982) 56
at 65.
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contradictory" 7S-is not without foundation.79 That economic interests have
benefitted from the Charter is indisputable, though the Court will not admit
it. In the Pepsi-Cola case, s° Chief Justice McLachlin and Justice LeBel,
writing for the Court, distinguished between those "fundamental Canadian
value[s]," like freedom of expression, and those diverse interests served by
the common law and "not engaged by the Charter. Salient among these are
the life of the economy and individual economic interests."'
's
The record of success for business interests has been mixed, but
there is little doubt that gains continue to be secured in the guise of making
constitutional law. As Gregory Hein shows, "corporate interests" are
actively engaging in Charter litigation-they represent nearly 40 per cent of
the cases that target the decisions of elected officials.8 2 Business firms have
had some success in conscripting Charter review in order to resist
government regulation. According to Richard Bauman, constitutional
challenges "have become an important strategic device for businesses as
they have made political gains through the process of Charter review.,
8 3
Nowhere is this success more apparent than in the field of
commercial speech. From its modest doctrinal beginnings in Ford4 to its
robust articulation in RJR-MacDonald,5 commercial expression under the
Charter has proven to be a valuable resource for promoting the buyer-seller
model. Once it is accepted that "all expressions of the heart and mind"
together with all "human activity" which "conveys or attempts to convey a
78 See Brenda Cossman, "Lesbians, Gay Men, and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms"
(2002) 40 Osgoode Hall L.J. 223 at 225.
Brad Daisley, "New Era of Charter Litigation on the Horizon" The Lawyer's Weekly (6 June
1997) 16. Justice McLachlin is quoted there as saying: "Where we have [Charter rights], the state has
a new tool to aid them in this protection, and indeed the Charter has been a way for disempowered
individuals, people who have no voice, to ... come before the court and bring [forward] issues like
discrimination on the basis of gender, poverty."
80 RWDSU, Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., 2002 SCC 8 [Pepsi-Cola].
81 Ibid. at para. 21.
82 Gregory Hein, "Interest Group Litigation and Canadian Democracy" in Paul Howe & Peter
H. Russell, eds.,JudicialPowerand Canadian Democracy (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press,
2001) 214.
83 Richard W. Bauman, "Business, Economic Rights, and the Charter" in David Schneiderman
& Kate Sutherland, eds., Charting the Consequences: The Impact of Charter Rights on Canadian Law
and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) 58. This is a phenomenon which, curiously,
escapes the attention of F.L. Morton & Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party
(Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview Press, 2000).
84 Ford v. Quebec (A.G.), [19881 2 S.C.R. 712 [Ford].
85 RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 [RJR-MacDonald).
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meaning" falls within the scope of constitutionally protected expression,86
then it comes as little surprise to find that the promotion of commercial
products will find safe harbour in the Charter.
The Court, however, has appeared agnostic about the relationship
between the state and the market. The constitutionalization of commercial
speech rights need not lead necessarily to the constitutionalization of "free
enterprise." The U.S. Supreme Court might be viewed as having gone
further along this road. Justice Blackmun wrote that commercial
speech-the "dissemination of information as to who is producing and
selling what product, for what reason, and what price"-is indispensable for
the maintenance of a "predominantly free enterprise economy.,
87
Instead, the Canadian Supreme Court appears to have been more
attracted to protecting the consumer's interest in receiving commercial
information.88 For the Court, constitutionalizing commercial speech has the
advantage of enabling individuals to make informed economic choices,
which is "an important aspect of individual self-fulfillment and personal
autonomy."89 In the interests of informing consumers, the Court even has
been prepared to enter the realm of labour relations-a domain which the
Court mostly has shielded from Charter review. The Court has identified a
public interest in receiving important messages about labour disputes,
either through consumer pamphleting at retail outlets9 or secondary
picketing.9' The juridical thrust of these cases is to value consumer
interests-the interests of buyers-which is equated with a public interest
in the free flow of commercial information. 92 By constitutionalizing the
86Attorney General of Quebec v. Irwin Toy, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at 968-69.
87 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 at 765
(1975) [Virginia State Board of Pharmacy]. For an argument that this amounts to the disguised revival
of discredited Lochnerism, see Thomas H. Jackson & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., "Commerical Speech:
Economic Due Process and the First Amendment" (1979) 65 Va. L. Rev. I at 30-32.
88 Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [19901 2 S.C.R. 232 at 247; RJR-
MacDonald, supra note 85 at 347. Admittedly, this too attracts the U.S. Supreme Court in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy, ibid.
8 9 Ford, supra note 84 at 767.
90 United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 1518 (U. F. C. W) v. KMart Canada Ltd., 119991 2
S.C.R. 1083 at 1105.
Pepsi-Cola, supra note 80 at paras. 34-35.
92 By endowing commercial speech with constitutional protection, the Court has helped to
promote what Leslie Sklair calls the "culture-ideology of consumerism": a "set of practices, attitudes
and values, based on advertising.., that encourages ever-expanding consumption of consumer goods."
See Leslie Sklair, "The Culture-Ideology of Consumerism in Urban China: Some Findings From a
Survey in Shanghai" in Clifford J. Shultz, Russell W. Belk & Giuliz Ger, eds., Research in Consumer
Behavior: Consumption in Marketizing Economies, vol. 7 (Greenwich, Conn.: Jai Press, 1994) at 260.
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interests of consumers, the Court also enhances the constitutional position
of producers, though this relationship is often obscured.
The Court was more frank about this relationship, however, in R.
v. Guignard.93 There, the Court invalidated a Saint-Hyacinthe municipal
bylaw prohibiting advertising outside of designated "industrial areas."
Roger Guignard erected a sign on one of his commercial properties
complaining about his insurance company's delay in indemnifying him for
repairs done several months earlier. On his billboard, Guignard announced:
"When a claim is made, one finds out about poor quality insurance."94
Justice LeBel, for the Court, embarked on his section 2(b) discussion by
acknowledging the great value placed on commercial speech by the Court
in previous decisions:
95
The need for such expression derives from the very nature of our economic system, which
is based on the existence of a free market. The orderly operation of that market depends
on businesses and consumers having access to abundant and diverse information. ... The
decisions of this Court accordingly recognize that commercial enterprises have a
constitutional right to engage in actiyities to inform and promote, by advertising.
The interests of commercial enterprise now are equally paramount
to those of consumers. Perhaps this only is a slight shift in emphasis. It goes
some distance, however, to reveal the direction the Court has taken-that
commercial speech doctrine is predicated upon the constitutional rights of
producers to bring products to market through advertising.96
According to Justice LeBel, consumers also have constitutional
rights to freedom of expression and this occasionally will take the form of
"counter-advertising": "Given the tremendous importance of economic
activity in our society, a consumer's 'counter-advertising' assists in
circulating information and protecting the interests of society just as much
as does advertising of certain forms of political expression." 97 So while it is
satisfying to see the Court valorize "culture-jamming," 9' it is disquieting to
2002 SCC 14 [Guignard].
Ibid. at para. 3.
95 Ibid. at paras. 21, 23.
96 This conclusion was embraced readily by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Vann Niagara Ltd.
v. Oakville (Town of) (14 June 2002), Toronto C36773 (Ont. C.A.). According to Justice Borins, for
the majority, commercial expression is "a key component to our economic system and therefore merits
Charter protection." See ibid. at para. 17.
97 Guignard, supra note 93 at para. 23.
On culture jamming, see any number of AdBusters and, for the definitive statement, see Kalle
Lasn, Culture Jam: How to Reverse America's Suicidal Consumer Binge-And Why We Must (New York:
Quill, 2000).
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see how far the Court has gone down the path of constitutionalizing the
social relations of the market based on the buyer-seller model.
C. Aboriginal Rights
The affirmation and recognition of existing Aboriginal rights in
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 undoubtedly has improved the
constitutional position of Aboriginal peoples. The promise of inter-societal
reconciliation between Aboriginal legal systems and the Canadian state
suggested by the Supreme Court in Sparrow,99 however, eroded significantly
during the Lamer years. t° It is not my object here to reprise or critique this
record;'t°Vrather, my aim in this part is to explore the extent to which, even
in this field, the buyer-seller model has entered into Canadian
constitutional discourse. This also is an opportunity to express some
ambivalence about the arrival of this model on the Canadian constitutional
scene. It presents, perhaps, new opportunities for Aboriginal peoples, but
also many attendant risks.
Much of the Americas were settled by European colonists without
the consent of, or in consultation with, First Nations. The Royal
Proclamation of 1763 signaled an end to this practice, committing the
Crown to seek the consent of Aboriginal peoples through the purchase of
their lands. In the interests of swiftly colonizing these "waste lands,"
however, legislative deviations from the principle "no acquisition without
consent" were frequent in the pre- and post-Confederation periods.0 2 Even
when treaties were entered into, often these were interpreted strictly and
against Aboriginal interests, or their terms were ignored altogether. In the
words of Miguel Alfonso Martfnez, United Nations Special Rapporteur,
treaties have undergone "a process of retrogression," depriving Indigenous
peoples of the essential elements of their sovereign status, "namely their
99R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 [Sparrow].
10 0 R. v. Van der Peet, [199612 S.C.R. 507 [Van der Peet]; R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 672
[Gladstone].
101See Michael Asch, "From Calder to Van der Peet: Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Law,
1973-96" in Paul Havemann, ed., Indigenous People's Rights in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand
(Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1999) 428.
102 These practices are comprehensively documented and discussed in Darlene Johnston, The
Taking of Indian Lands in Canada: Consent or Coercion? (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan
Native Law Centre, 1989) at 8.
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territory, their capacity to enter into international agreements, and their
specific forms of government."'0' 3
It might be said that the donor-donee model best represents
Aboriginal-Canadian state relations-Aboriginal people sharing, even
giving up, lands to facilitate mutual coexistence on the colonial frontier.104
From the European perspective, market imperatives came to shape these
inter-societal relations and so the buyer-seller model has a dominant
presence in these interactions. I argue here that the model is reflected in
the Crown's capacity to take Aboriginal lands. In this scenario, there is an
element of exchange as the Crown buys and Aboriginal people sell their
lands. The idea of purchase and sale is not alien to the field of takings
law.' °5 For instance, Montesquieu understood the exercise of eminent
domain as being in the nature of a forced sale. t0 6 Absent, however, is the
element of free exchange, as property is purchased without consent. In the
context of takings, then, the buyer-seller model takes on the hue of the
ruler-subject model.
Early formulations of the Indian Act included a statutory capacity
in the Crown to take Aboriginal lands for "any railway, road or public
work" with the payment of compensation.'0 7 These public works and
compensation requirements were dropped in 1951 when the Act was
revised. For a period of time, the Indian Act even enabled the compulsory
removal of Indians from reserve lands adjacent to towns and cities with
populations of more than eight thousand.'0 8 At present, section 35 of the
Indian Act entitles the Crown to compulsorily acquire Indian lands without
consent and without the payment of compensation.0 9
With the advent of the Constitution Act, 1982 things now have
changed. A strong version of the Indian Act takings rule was elevated to the
103 Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (final report
by Miguel Alfonso Martinez), Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Study on Treaties, Agreements and
Other Constructive Arrangements Between States and Indigenous Populations, UN ESCOR, 51 st Sess.,
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/20 at para. 105.
104 See Robert A. Williams, Jr., Linking Arms Together: American Indian Treaty Visions of Law
and Peace, 1600-1800 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) at 25.
105 Arthur Lenhoff, "Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain" (1942) 42 Colum. L.
Rev. 596 at 601.
106
Montesquieu, supra note I at 510, writes: "If the political magistrate wants to build some
public edifice, some new road, he must pay compensation; in this regard the public is like an individual
who deals with another individual."
107 Indian Act, S.C. 1868, c. 42, s. 25; Indian Act, S.C. 1876, c. 18, s. 20.
108 Johnston, supra note 102 at 86-88.
109 This is in contrast to statutory regimes for the expropriation of private property in place
across Canada which ordinarily require the payment of compensation.
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level of constitutional doctrine in Delgamuukw." Chief Justice Lamer,
writing for the Court, first broadened the permissible range of
governmental objectives which could infringe Aboriginal title beyond those
mentioned in Gladstone."' The "development of agriculture, forestry,
mining, and hydroelectric power, the general economic development of the
interior of ... [the province], protection of the environment or endangered
species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign
populations to support these aims" were the kind of objectives which could
justify limitations on Aboriginal title." 2 It should be noted that this wide
range of objectives little resembles the "strong check" on governmental
action that Chief Justice Dickson described in Sparrow."3
Chief Justice Lamer then moved to the question of reconciling
legislative authority with Aboriginal rights. In order to justify limitations on
Aboriginal title in the pursuit of these objectives, the Crown is expected to
"reflect the prior interest" of Aboriginal peoples in resource allocation, to
respect the duty of consultation, and to pay compensation:" 4
In keeping with the duty of honour and good faith on the Crown, fair compensation will
ordinarily be required when aboriginal title is infringed. The amount of compensation
payable will vary with the nature of the particular aboriginal title affected and with the
nature and severity of the infringement and the extent to which aboriginal interests were
accommodated.
The Delgamuukw decision thus elevates Aboriginal title to the level
of a constitutional interest requiring the payment of just compensation in
event of expropriation. Like the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the
U.S. Constitution, property cannot be taken for public use" 5 without the
payment of just compensation."6 Though there is some dispute in the
United States about which measures go so far as to require compensation,
the takings rule imposes substantial constraints on governmental authority
110 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010.
Supra note 100.
112 Delgamuukw, supra note I 10 at 1111.
113 Supra note 99.
114 Delgamuukw, supra note I 10 at 1114.
115The "public use" requirement has ceased to act as an impediment in modern U.S. law. This
is the subject of complaint in Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent
Domain (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985) at 161-81.
116 The comparison also is noted in James Youngblood Henderson, Marjorie L. Benson & Isobel
Findlay, Aboriginal Tenure in the Constitution of Canada (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 2000) at 332.
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as it impacts on property rights.1 7 It turns out, however, that the
incorporation of a takings rule into Canadian constitutional law does not
amount to wholesale adoption of the U.S. rule. Rather, it turns out to be
its opposite. Absent government recognition of ownership, the taking of
Indian title does not require the payment of compensation under the U.S.
constitution." 8 According to Justice Reed, the U.S. rule follows naturally
from Chief Justice Marshall's ruling in Johnson v. McIntosht 19 that
"discovery" gave exclusive underlying title to the conquering European
power:1
20
Every American schoolboy knows that the savage tribes of this continent were deprived of
their ancestral ranges by force and that, even when the Indians ceded millions of acres by
treaty in return for blankets, food and trinkets, it was not a sale but the conquerors' will that
deprived them of their land.
The constitutional recognition of Aboriginal title in Canada is long
overdue, but remains problematic for a variety of reasons. It is not my
intention to expound here on all of these reasons.' 2 ' That the rule continues
to vitiate the consent requirement is an obvious concern.12 If the element
of negotiated settlement is a prerequisite to constitutional reconciliation,
then a takings rule preserving unilateralism in regard to Aboriginal lands
is problematic. A constitutional takings rule also may preclude us from
exploring the suspect origins of the claim to underlying Crown sovereignty
that gives rise to this power of eminent domain. 23 Instead, adopting the
117
See Molly S. McUsic, "The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact on
Economic Legislation" (1996) 76 B.U.L. Rev. 605.
118 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) [Tee-Hit-Ton]. This decision was
adopted with approval by Justice Judson in Calder v. British Columbia (A.G.) (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d)
145 at 168 (S.C.C.).
l19Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
120 Tee-Hit-Ton, supra note 118 at 322-23.
121 It is not troublesome that the doctrine accords constitutional status only to Aboriginal
property interests. As Macklein argues, the fact of Aboriginal occupancy prior to the establishment
of the Canadian state justifies this differential treatment. See Patrick Macklem, Indigenous Difference
and the Constitution of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).
122 Consultation is always required, but "full consent" is required only in some cases,
"particularly when provinces enact hunting and fishing regulations in relation to aboriginal lands." See
Delgamuukw, supra note 110 at 1113.
123 See Michael Asch & Patrick Macklem, "Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An
Essay on R.v. Sparrow" (1991) 29 Alta. L. Rev. 498 at 510. The absorption of Aboriginal peoples within
the Canadian political community for the purposes of eminent domain does not mean equivalencywith
all citizens in regard to all property matters. Note that the content of Aboriginal title in Delgamuukw
is limited to land use not "irreconcilable" with the "nature" of Aboriginal title. A variety of commercial
uses inconsistent with that specific title (the Court mentions strip mining and construction of a parking
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tactics of the bricoleur and having access to a "limited cultural reserve,"' 24
the Court looked to the tools readily at hand in order to fill out the content
of Aboriginal title.'25 The common law has long recognized that the taking
of property requires the payment of compensation, though the Crown can
vitiate this presumption.'26 In other words, the requirement has never been
a constitutional one. But this move by the Court in the context of
Aboriginal rights fits dominant political trends. Foreign investors, for
instance, have a similar right to compensation under the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) should a state party take measures that go
so far as to expropriate or nationalize an investment interest. Although
property rights are not otherwise part of Canada's constitutional order,
t27
NAFTA's regime for the protection of investments has constitution-like
effects.' 28 The Court's Aboriginal rights jurisprudence can be viewed as
pushing us further along in this direction.
Some reasonably will ask whether it is appropriate to only extend
this sort of protection to foreign investors and Aboriginal peoples, and not
to all Canadians. International trade law writers admit that this, precisely,
is their end game: to have domestic legal systems absorb these very high
standards of protection for all property and investment interests. For
instance, Kenneth Vandevelde expresses the desire to have the investment
lot) are permitted only if land then is surrendered to the Crown for the purposes of economic
development along these lines (see Delgamuukw, supra note 110 at 1089). The author thanks Darlene
Johnston for this point.
124 Garvey, supra note 11 at 5.
125 The same claim might be made about the Van derPeet test-that s. 35(1) Aboriginal rights
are only those that are "a central and significant part of the society's distinctive culture." See Van der
Peet, supra note 100 at 553. Russel Barsh and James Henderson show that centrality requirement is
derived from the American constitutional experience, where only those religious beliefs "central and
indispensable" to an indigenous group will receive constitutional protection. They write: "Without
referring to the American experience, Canada's Supreme Court blithely copies it on an even grander
scale, applying 'centrality' to all rights of Aboriginal peoples." See Russel Lawrence Barsh & James
Youngblood Henderson, "The Supreme Court's Van derPeet Trilogy: Native Imperialism and Ropes
of Sand" (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 993 at 1000. Another borrowed idea is the "honor of the King," central
to the Sparrow justification process, which has its origins in the Crown prerogative and sovereign
immunity. See Joseph Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the Crown (London:
Butterworth, 1820) at 394. Justice Story of the U.S. Supreme Court invoked the concept so as to limit
governmental interference with contractual rights in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420
at 597 (1837).
126 See Andrfe Lajoie, Expropriation et Fidralisme au Canada (Montreal: Les Presses des
Universit6 de Montr6al, 1971).
127 Note the presence of a property rights clause, though, in the Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C.
1960, c. 44, s. 1 (a).
128 See David Schneiderman, "NAFTA's Takings Rule: American Constitutionalism Comes to
Canada" (1996) 46 U.T.L.J. 499.
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treaty system "protect all investment in the host state, regardless of
nationality. ... This would ensure genuine investment neutrality and create
a host constituency in support of an enduring liberal investment regime."' 29
Is it only a matter of time, then, before Canadians seek to amend their
constitutional order in order to ensure equal treatment as regards property,
drawing us further in the direction of the market model of constitutional
design?
V. CONCLUSION
This article explored the idea of constitutional bricolage-making
constitutional law with reference to "whatever is at hand.' ', 30 Following
Tushnet, I have suggested that it is a helpful heuristic device for elucidating
the rising interest in comparing and learning from other constitutional
traditions. While the rise of comparative constitutional law enables the
judiciary to reflect upon and import, even improve, the development of
constitutional law within their home countries, the opportunity carries with
it many risks. In an era of economic globalization, the judiciary will likely
look to those rules of constitutional law that impart success in global
economic terms. In the Canadian context, this means invoking the rules and
values usually associated with U.S. constitutional law, particularly the
variant that emphasizes the liberty-property nexus familiar to the Lochner
era. Situating this phenomenon within larger socio-economic and political
patterns-namely, the phenomenon associated with economic
globalization-better explains a particular comparative influence-the
buyer-seller model-in Canadian constitutional law.
This model has entered into Canadian constitutional law in the
disparate constitutional fields of federalism, the Charter, and Aboriginal
rights. There is no claim here that the buyer-seller model of constitutional
law explains all constitutional outcomes over the last twenty years, but it
likely helps to explain more of the outcomes than the few identified here.'
If one of the defining characteristics of Canadian constitutional law
has been the diversity of ideological commitments to which it may give
129 Kenneth J. Vandevelde, "The Political Economy of a Bilateral Investment Treaty" (1998) 92
A.J.I.L. 621 at 639.
130 lUvi-Strauss, supra note 6 at 17.
131 On federalism, see e.g. Jean Leclair, "The Supreme Court's Understanding of Federalism:
Efficiency at the Expense of Diversity," (Paper presented in Toronto to the Canadian Association of
Law Teachers 2002 Annual Conference, May 2002) [unpublished]. On the Charter, see Joel Bakan,Just
Words: Constitutional Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) c. 3-6.
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expression 132-- resulting, to be sure, in some dominant and steady streams
of socio-economic thought but none necessarily resulting from the
constitutional text-this pluralism may now be under threat. To the extent
that current trends continue, it will have the effect of foreclosing political
alternatives, checking further our capacity for self-government. If there is
room for constitutional difference in a world of increasing constitutional
convergence and homogeneity, we reasonably might conclude that it will
not be the judiciary, through the aegis of constitutional interpretation, who
will be the vanguard reversing or even resisting these tendencies.
132 See Patrick Macklen, "Constitutional Ideologies" (1988) 20 Ottawa L. Rev. 117 at 121;
Roderick A. Macdonald, "The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: How Far Does It Or Should It
Stretch?" in The Law and Politics: Proceedings of the 1993 New Zealand Law Conference Held March
2 - 5, 1993, vol. 1 (Wellington: New Zealand Law Society, 1993) 94 at 104.
